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                            OPINION 
                                                
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
     Defendants Asbestos Workers Union Local 42 Pension Fund, Asbestos 
Workers 
Union Local 42 Pension Plan (Plan), and the trustees of the Plan 
(Trustees) appeal the 
District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff John V. 
Ryan, Jr.  
Defendants challenge the District Court's conclusion that they violated 
204(g) of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.  1001 
et seq., 
by impermissibly reducing Ryan's accrued benefits.  On cross-appeal, Ryan 
challenges 
the District Court's refusal to award attorney's fees pursuant to ERISA  
502(g)(1).  For 
the reasons stated below, we will affirm the District Court's order 
granting summary 
judgment to Ryan.  We will, however, vacate the District Court's order, 
denying 
attorney's fees, and remand this case to the District Court for further 
consideration of the 
fee application. 
                           I.  Facts 
     Ryan is a former member of Asbestos Workers Union Local 42 and a 
participant in 
the Local's Pension Plan.   The Plan entitles Ryan to receive fixed, 
periodic pension 
payments in an amount based upon his Credited Service.  The first page of 
the Summary 
Plan Description (SPD) states that the Plan provides each participant with 
"[n]ormal 
retirement at age 65 if you have less than 25 years of Credited Service 
and have reached 
the 5th anniversary date of your participation in the Plan, or at any 
earlier age that you 
have 25 years of Credited Service."  At page nine, the SPD states that 
"[i]f you are a 
participant and have reached your Normal Retirement Date, you may retire 
and become 
eligible for a normal retirement pension."  "Normal Retirement Date" is 
defined on page 8 
of the SPD as "the date you complete 25 years of Credited Service." 
     Between 1955 and 1996, Ryan worked in the trade as a member of Local 
42 for 
two different periods.  During these periods of employment, he earned a 
total of 25 years 
of Credited Service.  Ryan earned 14 years of Credited Service between 
1955 and 1969, 
and 11 years of Credited Service from 1984 until his retirement in 1996.  
Between 1970 
and 1983, Ryan worked outside the trade and thus experienced a 13 year 
"break in 
service."  (In 1983, Ryan returned to work in the trade but did not work 
long enough to 
earn any Credited Service during that year.)   
     Prior to 1983, plan participants could join periods of service for 
the purpose of 
pension benefits if the period of service before the break-in-service 
exceeded the period 
of the break-in-service.  Pursuant to this arrangement, Ryan for example 
could join a 
second period of service to his initial 1955-69 period of service if his 
break-in-service did 
not exceed 14 years. 
     In 1983, however, the Plan adopted an amendment which created a two-
tier benefit 
scheme for those participants who experience more than a 10-year break-in-
service.   As 
amended, Section 6.01(c) of the Plan states that: 
     If a participant has more than one date that he ceased to be an 
Active 
     Participant a different pension level may apply to each period of 
active 
     participation in accordance with (b) above.  However, if the 
participant again 
     becomes an Active Participant before he has 10 consecutive One-Year 
Breaks 
     in Service and has at least 1,000 Hours of Service in each of two 
Calendar 
     Years after returning to Covered Employment his previous pension 
level(s) 
     will be disregarded and the pension level in effect when he again 
ceases to be 
     an Active Participant will be applied to the Credited Service he 
earned during 
     each period of his active participation. 
      
     The parties agree that, given the timing of the amendment, Ryan could 
not have 
taken steps to limit his break in service to less than 10 years in order 
to avoid the two- 
tiered benefit scheme.  
     When Ryan retired at age 60, he applied for benefits under the Plan, 
claiming 
benefits corresponding to his total 25 years of Credited Service.  The 
Trustees calculated 
Ryan's benefits under the two-tiered scheme set out in amended Section 
6.03(c) because 
Ryan had experienced a 13-year break-in-service.  Under the two-tier 
benefit scheme, 
Ryan receives one level of benefits calculated at a rate of $8.50 per 
month for his first 14 
years of Credited Service and another level of benefits calculated at 
$69.00 per month for 
his last 11 years of Credited Service.  Consequently, Ryan receives a 
total monthly 
pension of approximately $855.  Ryan appealed this decision, arguing that 
the higher rate 
of $69.00 per month should apply to all of his years of Credited Service.  
Accordingly, 
Ryan contends that he is entitled to a minimum monthly pension of $1,725 
(in addition to 
other supplemental benefits recently provided to all retired plan 
participants).  Citing 
amended Section 6.01(c), the defendants disagree.  
                    II.  Procedural History 
     Ryan initiated this action on November 12, 1997, by filing a two 
count complaint 
with the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.  The 
complaint alleged 
that Section 6.01(c) is an illegal rule insofar as it violates the 
Department of Labor's Rule 
of Parity, 29 C.F.R.  2530.210(g) (2001).  
     On November 6, 1998, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the 
complaint for 
failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and Ryan filed a 
cross-motion for 
summary judgment.  After the parties briefed these motions, the District 
Court requested 
supplemental briefs addressing whether the application of the amended 
Section 6.01(c) 
retroactively decreased Ryan's accrued benefits in violation of ERISA  
204(g)(1).  See 
29 U.S.C.  1054(g)(1).  After considering the supplemental briefs and 
oral argument, the 
District Court denied defendants' motion to dismiss and granted Ryan's 
motion for 
summary judgment.  See Ryan v. Asbestos Workers Union Local 42 Pension 
Fund, et al., 
2000 WL 1800530 (D.Del. Apr. 4, 2000).   
     Having based its decision on the theory that the granting of a two-
tiered pension 
for Ryan pursuant to the provisions of amended  6.01(c) violated ERISA  
204(g)(1), the 
District Court granted Ryan leave to amend his complaint to include this 
theory of 
liability.  Consequently, on April 18, 2000, Ryan filed an amended 
complaint, adding the 
 204(g)(1) theory of liability as "Count III." 
     On April 17, 2000, defendants filed a motion for reconsideration 
which the District 
Court denied.  At the same time, the District Court entered an order 
declining to award 
counsel fees in favor of Ryan.  Both the defendants and Ryan filed timely 
appeals. 
           III.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
     The District Court had federal question jurisdiction over the instant 
case, as the 
action arose under ERISA.  See 28 U.S.C.  1331.  Because the District 
Court's judgment 
is final and disposes of all of the parties' claims, we have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. 1291. 
     The District Court's grant of summary judgment for Ryan is subject to 
plenary 
review.  See, e.g., Reform Party v. Allegheny County Dept. of Elections, 
174 F.3d 305, 
312 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing American Med. Imaging Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. 
Co., 949 F.2d 690, 692 (3d Cir.1991)).  In our review of the grant of 
summary judgment, 
we apply the same test that the District Court should have applied 
initially, viewing 
inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party.  See, 
e.g., Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976), 
cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 1038 (1977).  We will affirm the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment if 
the record shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c). 
     While ERISA  502(g)(1) clearly places an award of attorneys' fees 
within a 
district court's discretion, Third Circuit precedent makes our review more 
complex than 
an "abuse of discretion" review.  Compare 29 U.S.C.  1132(g)(1) with 
Ursic v. 
Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 673 (3d Cir. 1983) and Anthuis v. Colt 
Industries 
Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 999, 1012 (3d Cir. 1992).  As explained more 
fully below, a 
district court must articulate certain aspects of its reasoning in 
exercising or refusing to 
exercise its ERISA  502(g)(1) fee-setting discretion.  
                        IV.  Discussion 
     A.   Grant of Summary Judgment in favor of Ryan 
     ERISA  204(g)(1) prohibits the retroactive reduction of "accrued 
benefits" by 
operation of a plan amendment.  See 29 U.S.C.  1054(g)(1) (2001); see 
also Hoover v. 
Cumberland Maryland Area Teamsters Pension Fund, 756 F.2d 977, 984 (3d 
Cir. 1985) 
("Section 204(g) of ERISA protects all accrued benefits from reduction by 
plan 
amendment, vested or not, and without regard to whether benefits are 
currently being paid 
to a participant who has already retired.").  The parties agree that the 
Trustees' 
amendment to   and subsequent application of   Section 6.01(c) of the Plan 
reduced 
Ryan's benefits.  Consequently, the sole issue raised by defendants on 
appeal is whether 
Ryan's benefits are "accrued benefits" as defined in ERISA and protected 
by  204(g)(1).   
     Citing the clear language of the SPD, the District Court found that 
Ryan's benefits 
are accrued benefits.  We agree with the District Court's conclusion.  
Section 3(23) of 
ERISA defines "accrued benefit" as "the individual's accrued benefit 
determined under 
the plan . . . expressed in the form of an annual benefit commencing at 
normal retirement 
age . . .."  29 U.S.C.  1002(23)(A).  In Ryan's case, the term "normal 
retirement age" 
means the earlier of "the time [Ryan] attains normal retirement age under 
the [P]lan, or . . 
. the time [Ryan] attains age 65 . . . ."  Id. at 1002(24).  Ryan was 
younger than 65 when 
he started receiving his benefits.  Therefore, his benefits are accrued 
benefits only if he 
began receiving them at an earlier "normal retirement age" set forth in 
the Plan.   
     The defendants contend that Ryan's benefits are in fact early 
retirement benefits 
and for that reason are not protected by  204(g).  Defendants contend 
that the District 
Court erred by confusing retirement date with retirement age -- and since 
Ryan had not 
reached the retirement age of 65, his retirement was an early one. 
     We conclude, however, that Ryan did not take early retirement and 
that the District 
Court correctly determined that his accrued benefits were protected by  
204(g). 
     The SPD language quoted above provides each participant with 
"[n]ormal 
retirement . . . at any earlier age that [he or she has] 25 years of 
Credited Service."  The 
District Court, therefore, correctly found that the Plan set forth a 
normal retirement age at 
any age before 65 for participants who have earned 25 years Credited 
Service and 
correctly concluded that Ryan's benefits are accrued benefits. 
     This result is supported by our decision in Geib v. New York State 
Teamsters 
Conference Pension & Retirement Fund, 758 F.2d 973 (3d Cir. 1985).  In 
Geib, we 
addressed the issue whether ERISA  203(a) protects pensioners from the 
suspension of 
benefit payments received before normal retirement age.  See 758 F.2d at 
976.  
Answering this question in the negative, we found that the plan at issue 
in Geib failed to 
set forth a normal retirement age earlier than age 65 as permitted by 
ERISA  3(24).  See 
id. at 976-77.  The Geib court distinguished Nichols v. Board of Trustees 
of the Asbestos 
Workers Local 24 Pension Plan, 1 E.B.C. (BNA) 1868 (D.D.C. 1979), on which 
plaintiffs 
relied, noting that the language of the plan at issue in Nichols did set 
forth 25 years of 
credited service as a normal retirement age.  See 758 F.2d at 976.  The 
plan language in 
Nichols was substantively identical to the SPD language quoted above.  It 
read: 
     An employee shall be eligible to receive a Normal Pension if he 
retires after:  
     a) he has been credited with twenty-five (25) years of credited 
service at any 
     age, or b) he has attained the age of sixty-five (65) and has been 
credited with 
     a minimum of five (5) years of credited service. 
      
Nichols, 1 E.B.C. (BNA) at 1868.  Geib's conclusion regarding the plan at 
issue in 
Nichols supports the conclusion that the Plan here sets an alternative 
normal retirement 
age at the time that a participant attains 25 years of Credited Service. 
     We note moreover that Ryan's retirement benefits have not been 
actuarily reduced 
to award to him at age 60 the present value of his age 65 benefits.  If in 
fact his benefits 
had been considered by the Trustees to be early retirement benefits, they 
would have been 
so reduced. 
     Defendants contend nevertheless that the Trustees did not act 
arbitrarily and 
capriciously when they awarded benefits to Ryan under the two tier system.  
We have, 
however, determined as a matter of law that the two tier system does not 
apply under the 
undisputed facts of Ryan's situation.  Under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard of 
review, we need not defer to the Trustees' decisions which are "without 
reason, 
unsupported by substantial evidence or erroneous as a matter of law."  
Courson v. Bert 
Bell NFL Player Retirement Plan, 214 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2000) (emphasis 
added).  See 
also Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 2001 WL 1185796 (3d Cir. 
2001); 
Abnathya v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40 (3d Cir. 1993).   
     We will therefore affirm the summary judgment in favor of Ryan. 
     B.   Denial of Attorney's Fees 
     In deciding whether to award attorney's fees pursuant to ERISA  
502(g)(1), a 
district court must consider the following five factors:  (1) the 
offending parties' 
culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability of the offending parties to 
satisfy an award of 
attorneys' fees; (3) the deterrent effect of an award of attorneys' fees 
against the offending 
parties; (4) the benefit conferred on members of the pension plan as a 
whole; and (5) the 
relative merits of the parties' position.  See Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 
719 F.2d 670, 673 
(3d Cir. 1983).  See also McPherson v. Employees' Pension Plan of American 
Re- 
Insurance Co., 33 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 1994) (expounding the first, third and 
fifth Ursic 
factors).  Furthermore, "in each instance in which the district court 
exercises its fee- 
setting discretion, it must articulate its considerations, its analysis, 
its reasons and its 
conclusions touching on each of the five factors delineated in Ursic."  
Anthuis v. Colt 
Industries Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 999, 1012 (3d Cir. 1992). 
     That the District Court failed to sufficiently set forth its analysis 
of the five Ursic 
factors is plain from the face of its order accompanying Ryan II.  In 
refusing to award 
fees and costs, the District Court wrote only "[i]n its discretion, the 
court will decline to 
award counsel fees in favor of the Plaintiff."  Significantly, the 
District Court did not 
mention any of the Ursic factors.  Such a complete disregard of Ursic 
fails to satisfy our 
requirements.  See Anthuis, 971 F.2d at 1012 (holding the district court's 
recitation of 
two of the five Ursic factors without analysis insufficient). 
     It would not be appropriate for this Court to analyze the Ursic 
factors and make a 
determination regarding Ryan's request for attorneys' fees on appeal.  As 
Judge Weis 
stated in Ursic, "the discretion to set attorney's fees is allocated to 
the district courts and 
not the courts of appeals.  Even when a district court judgment is vacated 
by this court 
and remanded for further proceedings . . . it is the district court, and 
not this court, which 
possesses the authority to exercise fee setting discretion."  Ursic, 719 
F.2d at 674 
(citations omitted).  Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court's 
order denying 
Ryan's request for attorneys' fees and remand this matter to the District 
Court for further 
consideration of this issue. 
 
                                                                 
 
TO THE CLERK: 
 








                              /s/ Jane R. Roth                    
                                          Circuit Judge  
